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I am indebted to Philip Quinn for putting me in a new predicament. Usually I 
am accused of being a radical Christian voice that overemphasizes God's re-
demption so that the created order is undervalued. My emphasis on the distinc-
tive character of Christian ethics is alleged to make impossible any attempt to 
benefit from non-Christian wisdom. But according to Quinn the problem is ex-
actly the reverse as I come close to domesticating the radical nature of the gos-
pel of Christ by making Aristotle part of the Christian tradition. Caught between 
these unhappy characterizations I can only think I am either very confused or, 
given the intellectual options of modernity, what I am about is not easily under-
stood. I suspect there is some truth in both characterizations, but I am going to 
try to clear up some of the confusions by responding to Quinn. 
I must begin by rejecting Quinn's own self-description as a "splitter." The 
very distinction between "Jumpers" and "splitters" is one generated by one well 
initiated into intellectual practices of lumping. I do not say that in criticism, for 
as Quinn points out, any significant attempt at ethical theory--which is not the 
same thing as attempts to illumine how we should live as Christians--will entail a 
genealogical narrative that inevitably lumps. My problem is not that Quinn is a 
lumper, but rather that I find his narrative unbelievable. 
His story goes something like this: Things were going well for Christians as 
long as they followed God's commands and asked for forgiveness when they dis-
obeyed those commands. This lasted for approximately the first four centuries of 
Christian history and climaxed in the thought of Augustine. However, Christians 
became attracted to pagan thinkers and the result was a terrible loss of Christian 
insight. While there was some hope in later scholastic sources, the decisive redis-
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covery of Christian morality occurred in the Reformation and climaxed in the 
eighteenth century with Kant. This renewal of Christian ethics, however, has not 
fared well in modernity. It now becomes our task as Christians to preserve ethics 
of duty in a liberal culture based on utilitarianism. 
To begin, I think it extraordinary that Quinn seems to believe that the great 
alternatives are between something called "paganism" and "Augustinian Christi-
anity." Does he really believe that Augustine represents Christianity that has not 
already been shaped by pagan influences? Augustine, after all, was not exactly 
innocent of Platonism. Why is Platonic paganism good but Aristotelian paganism 
bad? Moreover, the very appeal to Augustine as the great hero of Quinn's story 
is odd since Augustine's display of the Christian life in The Morals of the Catho-
lic Church is in the language of the virtues--admittedly all as forms of love, but 
still a long way from Kant's ethic of duty qua duty. 
I confess that I prefer Aristotle's account of the virtues to that of Plato be-
cause, as I tried to show in my articles, Aristotle's account of the virtues as habits 
inextricably requires an account of temporality. (It may well be true, as Macin-
tyre argues, that the difference between Plato's and Aristotle's account of the 
moral life has been overdrawn. Yet certainly the Plato that Augustine learned 
through neo-Platonism was far from Aristotle's account of the virtues.) Such 
timefulness, I think, at least provides an opening for Christian appropriation of 
the virtues now determined by the story we tell of Jesus of Nazareth. Platonic 
accounts of Christianity always tend toward gnosticism as Jesus simply becomes 
an exemplar of prior existing truth. Interestingly, it is Aristotle that allows for a 
decisive reconstitution of the virtues as well as their individuation as determined 
by faithfulness to Jesus. 
So, ironically, my attempt to use the "pagan" Aristotle was in the interest of 
my more determinative theological interest in displaying how the Christian con-
viction that Jesus is God's messiah requires a radical revision of Aristotle's 
understanding of the virtues. Yet such a radical revision is still a revision as God 
does not redeem us in the abstract but as people who are constituted in and by 
concrete histories. It is my sense that Aristotle's account of the virtues, and in 
particular how the virtues are interrelated to happiness and friendship, can help 
Christians understand better bow we are called to live as disciples of Jesus. 
Yet I must acknowledge that there are other, equally possible, accounts of 
bow we should live as Christians that make no mention of Aristotle and/or the 
virtues. It is not as if the New Testament is devoid of the language of virtue, 1 but 
discipleship is surely a more prominent category. The crucial issue is not 
whether virtue or command is more determinative, but rather whether whatever 
conceptual alternative we use helps us as Christians to be more faithful disciples. 
What must be acknowledged, however, is that there is no "pure" Christianity 
anywhere--particularly in the New Testament and/or Augustine. 
Of course Quinn is right that Aristotle has no conception of sin, but the prob-
lem with Quinn's way of putting the matter is that it makes it appear that sin is 
the first word Christians have to speak about the moral life. Our first word is not 
sin, but that Jesus is the Christ. Our sin can only be known in the light of Jesus' 
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cross. That is why the gospel is good news and proclamation. Christ did not 
come to condemn the world, but to save it--we are only condemned because we 
are first saved. 
Ironically, Quinn's understanding of sin, as well as the status he gives it, is not 
unlike Protestant liberal theology's attempt to make sin a form of natural theol-
ogy. No longer believing that all creation is intelligible only as it manifests God's 
glory, Protestants retreated to sin as a natural category that could be known ab-
stracted from Christ. Of course the great paradigm of this is Quinn's hero--Im-
manuel Kant. I suspect that Quinn thinks he can have Kant's account of duty and 
sin without having Kant's account of Jesus in Religion Within the Limits of Rea-
son Alone. If so, he certainly owes us an account of that neat trick. For Kant, sin 
is a more determinative reality than the Jesus who is, for Kant, but the exemplifi-
cation of the archetype already present to reason. Kant and Plato alike have no 
place for truth that is historically contingent. 
None of this is meant to deny that sin is a crucial issue for how we think of 
these matters. As Quinn notes, Martha Nussbaum, in her recent review of 
Maclntyre's mtose Justice? mtich Rationality?, criticizes Macintyre for taking 
seriously the Christian doctrine of sin.z Nussbaum's account of Augustine's 
understanding of sin as sexual desire is badly off target as well as how she under-
stands the relation of sin, rationality and authority. Nonetheless she has put her 
finger on one of the fundamental issues between Christians and the ethos of 
modernity. For she is quite right to suggest that the project of modernity to se-
cure moral agreement through the construction of common norms requires the 
suppression of the Christian confession of sin. Yet she, like Quinn, seems to as-
;ume that sin is intelligible separate from the more determinative witness we 
nake as Christians that our existence is determined for the enjoyment of God 
'orever made sure through the resurrection of Christ.3 
What I find so troubling about Quinn's appeal to a "morality of duty" is his 
ailure to see that there is no "divine command tradition of Christian ethics." In-
leed I think we would be hard pressed to discover such a tradition in Christian-
ty before Kant. To be sure, there are commands of all kinds and types through 
lie Christian Scriptures, but they are never assumed to be intelligible separate 
:om the story of what it means to be Israel and/or the Church. Commands, like 
te virtues, require a narrative context for their intelligibility. I, along with many 
thers, have argued this time and time again, but it seems to have no effect for 
1ose determined that the Scriptures are best read through Kantian eyes. 
In that respect I think Quinn is right to see the Reformation as playing a deci-
ve role. But it is not as he would have it, namely that the Reformers liberated 
ugustinian Christianity from pagan influences, but rather that the Reformation 
:gan the process that handed the authority of the Church to the secular state. 
was certainly not what the Reformers intended, but it was the inevitable re-
It of the divorce of scriptural authority from the magisterial authority of the 
mrch. The ethics of duty becomes the theological necessity for assuring the 
1edience of the individual to state control. That Protestant ethics was so shaped 
but a manifestation of the inability of Protestantism to challenge the idolatry 
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intrinsic to the rise of the modern nation state. That the moral life of Protes-
tants, particularly in the United States, has been degraded into forms of bour-
geois self-fulfillment is ironically the result of the development of duty-formed 
ethics abstracted from any account of goods necessary for our flourishing.4 So if 
Quinn is unhappy with liberal modernity, I suggest he ought to remember the 
immortal words of Pogo--"We have met the enemy and he is us." 
Quinn cannot, of course, be held accountable for failing to intuit the political 
agenda that is the background to my articles on Aristotle, since I certainly did 
not make that explicit. Yet the very way I tried to interrelate happiness, the life 
of virtue, and friendship was meant to suggest why those themes are so destruc-
tively separated by our current political arrangements. I should have thought that 
Quinn might have noticed how Aristotle's understanding of the relationship be-
tween politics and friendship is a decisive challenge to liberal political regimens 
that thrive on the Kantian presumptions that the primary moral issue is how to 
secure fair relations between strangers. To be a community capable of fostering 
friendships, as I believe the Church is and should be, is a significant political wit-
ness in such a world. 
I must admit that Quinn's general argument about the necessity to provide a 
genealogy of "ethics" does raise a challenge to which I am unsure how to re-
spond. He rightly associates me with the narrative Macintyre tells of the Chris-
tian appropriation of Aristotle. What concerns me is not whether this is a pa-
ganization of Christianity, but rather whether grand narratives such as Macintyre 
constructs do not remain committed to some form of Constantinian Christianity 
and, thus, legitimate forms of dominations antithetical to Christian friendship. 
This remains a challenge to me. I am convinced there is no way around such nar-
ratives if we are to resist the powers of modernity. Yet I fear those very narra-
tives may become the master rather than the servant to the gospel. That is why 
Maclntyre's argument about Aquinas's method of disputation is necessary for 
any account of Christian truth is so important. That "method" makes clear that 
Christians believe that "reason" is an ongoing process in which even the weakest 
member must have a voice. 
That is why I find Nussbaum's critique of Maclntyre's account of practical ra-
tionality as authoritarian so bizarre. In After Virtue where Macintyre used the 
example of chess, Nussbaum suggests he still has a place for critical reason, but 
by employing the hockey player example in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 
Macintyre allegedly wishes people to be characterized by unthinking conformity. 
Nussbaum's argument not only betrays a shocking ignorance of the skill required 
to pass a hockey puck at the right time and in the right manner, but even more 
she does not appreciate how rationality but names the process by which a com-
munity discovers the goods in common. In spite of her illuminating account of 
Aristotle, Nussbaum, in some of her work, continues to hanker after an account 
of "critical reason" more characteristic of Kant than Aristotle. It may be that 
Maclntyre's account of rationality is too " rationalistic," but at least he begins the 
process of helping us recover an account of rationality as correlative to social 
process. For Christians this at least means that our convictions will, of course. 
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appear arbitrary when we are less than a people formed to be friends of God 
and one another. 
The issues Quinn raises concerning the relation of friendship and love are not 
easily sorted out. I certainly would not want to suggest that the Christian obliga-
tion to love the neighbor is the same as becoming the neighbor's friend. How-
ever, I think it equally important to resist construal of Christian agape in terms 
of the Kantian notion of disinterestedness that has been so prevalent in modern 
theology and ethics. Impartial love is not love but false egalitarianism that 
threatens the being of one so "loved." 
In terms of Quinn's more particular criticism of the position I tried to de-
velop, I am content to let the articles speak for themselves. I am grateful to him 
for providing me the opportunity to at least suggest the larger agenda behind 
them. Though I am unhappy with the current disciplinary distinction between 
theology and philosophy, I suspect behind this disagreement between Quinn and 
myself lies the difference between the theologian and the philosopher.s 
Notes 
1. See, for example, my "On Developing Hopeful Virtues," Christian Scholars Review, 2 
(December, 1988): 107-117. 
2. Martha Nussbaum, "Recoiling from Reason," Nt!W Yorlc Review of Books, 36 (Decem-
ber 7, 1989): 36-41. 
3. For my further reflections on Nussbaum's quite extraordinary project see my "Can 
Aristotle Be a Liberal: Nussbaum on Luck," Soundings (forthcoming). 
4. Quinn, I think, fails to appreciate how Kant's account of autonomy manifested as well 
iS spawned the kind of individualism that has made the growth of the authoritarian state 
:Oevitable. Ironically, the more autonomy we have as individuals the more we need the 
'command" of the state to produce any semblance of order. 
i. I am indebted to David Matzko and Philip Kenneson for their suggestions for how I 
night respond to Quinn. I am, in particular, indebted to Mr. Matzko for the title of this 
esponse. 

